You are looking at a map that links the effects of COVID-19 in the United States with a wide range of social, economic, and environmental conditions.

It compares four indexes of vulnerability alongside COVID-19 data and presents multiple options for addressing the effects of the pandemic with a Community Health Corps.

These conditions and vulnerabilities predated the pandemic and created the conditions for the virus to flourish in this country. The map displays the acute inequalities embedded in the social and political landscape of the United States. This pandemic is not simply biological. It is a symptom of an illness in our body politic. As SARS-CoV-2 roars across the country, it is following the fault lines of social vulnerability.

As the New York Times reported in July 2020, “Black and Latino people have been disproportionately affected by the coronavirus in a widespread manner that spans the country, throughout hundreds of counties in urban, suburban and rural areas, and across all age groups.”1

Repairing the wounds of this pandemic means confronting the policy decisions made long ago that have led us to this moment. As we try to combat this disease, we have to think more broadly about rebuilding health from the ground up in the United States.

We have proposed a New Deal for Public Health, with a Community Health Corps that goes beyond testing and tracing to confront the underlying conditions that have sickened and killed so many people in the United States.2 A new Community Health Corps must be integrated into our communities, providing economic support and social services to start to undo the vulnerabilities that plague us. We call this a new politics of care.

The Community Health Corps should be deployed across the United States. This map poses a series of questions and demands a set of options about how these care workers might be distributed to states and to counties within each state. Making these decisions responsibly requires confronting and addressing not just the virus and the disease but also the inequalities and vulnerabilities that underlie and propel this pandemic.

Project Directors:

Gregg Gonsalves, Assistant Professor, Yale School of Public Health and Co-Director Yale Global Health Justice Partnership

Laura Kurgan, Professor of Architecture, GSAPP and Director Center for Spatial Research(CSR), Columbia University.

Project Team:

Map Development and Data Analysis:

Dare Brawley, Assistant Director, Center for Spatial Research, Columbia University

Jia Zhang, Mellon Associate Research Scholar, Columbia Center for Spatial Research

Suzan Iloglu, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Yale School of Public Health

Thomas Thornhill, Research Associate, Yale School of Public Health

GSAPP-CSR, Graduate Research Assistants:
Adeline Chum, Nelson De Jesus Ubri

Two General Challenges

Two general challenges run throughout this project.

The first challenge is epistemological. Which population(s) will benefit the most from community health workers (CHWs)? While the empirical research on the effects of CHWs shows that they are largely beneficial, these studies are few in number and examine interventions for specific conditions with limited generalizability. In addition, while there is much literature on the systemic disparities of health care associated with social and economic factors, the publicly available data for these factors has poor spatial and temporal resolution. Finally, there are few studies that look at the impact of CHWs on critical outcomes like deaths averted3 or health costs minimized.4 This is a challenge for the field of health policy and our political leaders: we need more rigorous evaluations of the effects of CHW programs in the United States, but such evaluations require data that, at this point, is not in the public domain or accessible to researchers even by data use agreements with government agencies.

The second challenge is ethical. Let’s assume that our epistemological problems were satisfied, such that we could, with absolute certainty, both locate and quantify the marginal benefit an individual would gain from a CHW. Given a limited number of CHWs, how should we prioritize individuals and communities to whom they are allocated? Throughout our project, we have assumed an approach that seeks to improve health care by reducing health disparities. That said, without knowing how different populations would benefit differently from CHWs, we are unable to quantify the impact of each allocation method.

A consequence of these two challenges is that there is no single correct choice for how to allocate CHWs. Each choice has both benefits and limitations, giving a larger number of resources to certain types of locations and giving fewer resources to others. In what follows, we outline these differences.

We can make better choices with better data. This project begins with what data is available now and paints a picture of how different kinds of vulnerability shape the landscape of the United States in different ways. What would a Community Health Corps look like if those working for it followed the fault lines of each of these metrics for defining vulnerability and inequity in the United States?

Defining Vulnerability
What do social and economic vulnerability and health risk look like in the United States?

We have chosen seven metrics to identify health-related vulnerabilities by county and have organized them under two broad themes: (1) social and economic vulnerability and (2) COVID-19. Social and economic vulnerability can be measured by the CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index (SVI),5 number of Medicaid enrollees, 6 Years of Potential Life Lost (YPLL), 7 and unemployment rates. 8 As we know, the pandemic is not playing out randomly across the country; it is following trajectories of social and economic vulnerability at the local level. Thus, among our metrics, we also include the following COVID-19 metrics by county: COVID-19 cases (last 14 days), COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents (last 14 days), and cumulative deaths per 100,000 residents attributable to COVID-19. 9 The more recent data tell us about the pandemic now; the cumulative figures show us the path of destruction since the virus arrived in the United States.

A Proposal for a Community Health Corps of One Million Workers

Earlier this year, proposals for a national health corps were promoted by several members of Congress, including Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Chris Coons (D-DE), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Ed Markey (D-MA), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Tina Smith (D-MN), and Cory Booker (D-NJ). We have called directly for a million-person community health corps to address the myriad needs presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and the preexisting health disparities in communities hardest hit by the coronavirus.

We allocate the proposed one million CHWs to states in proportion to their respective Medicaid enrollment numbers, which we update monthly as we have seen enrollment increasing as a result of rising unemployment.10 We then use the vulnerability metrics above—COVID-19 cases, COVID-19 cases per capita, SVI, YPLL, unemployment, and number of Medicaid enrollees—to outline multiple ways to allocate CHW resources to counties within states.

Again, none of these choices is the “right” one—they all depend on your vision for how you conceptualize vulnerability. This project visualizes the differences and trade-offs between each of these choices.

Data about Vulnerability

Each method of quantifying vulnerability captures some populations and excludes others. As well, key data are limited by their geographic resolution and the frequency with which they are updated. In what follows, we outline what factors are included in each metric and differences in the availability of data on vulnerability, and we discuss advantages and limitations of each dataset.

Social Vulnerability Index (SVI)*

The Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) is a metric published by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to spatially identify communities that are likely to be the most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of disasters and disease outbreaks. SVI is a composite score of 15 social factors equally weighted and organized under four themes derived from the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS).

Our study uses a modified version of the CDC SVI index to facilitate the proportional allocation of CHWs. The CDC generates their SVI index by calculating percentile rankings for each county within states across 15 individual variables, summing these percentile rankings and then calculating an overall percentile ranking for each county within its state. In our method (SVI*), we first calculate the ratio between each county’s value and overall state value for each of the 15 variables. We then take the average of these ratios across the 15 individual variable values for each county. We use the resulting value as the SVI* for each county in our model.

The table below highlights places that would receive the most CHW resources when prioritizing by SVI. As a composite index, locations with high values across more than one of these four categories would receive the most resources.

Socioeconomic Status Household Composition and Disability Race/Ethnicity and Language Housing Type and Transportation
Population below federal poverty level

Unemployed population

Income

Population without a high school diploma
Population over 65

Population under 17

Population over 5 years old with a disability

Single-parent households
Population of color

Population that speaks english “less than well”
Number of housing structures with more than ten units

Number of mobile homes

Crowding (more people than rooms in home)

Households without a vehicle

Population living in group quarters


Strengths of SVI Data
  • SVI is an accepted metric for social vulnerability.
  • SVI captures many aspects of general and Covid related social and economic-related vulnerabilities.
Limitations of SVI Data
  • Data is lagged. The SVI is calculated using the latest available data from the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates which 2014-2018 and county demographics and characteristics may have changed since then.
  • SVI has limited empirical validation. SVI was initially designed as a theoretical model for natural disasters and has since been expanded to include disease outbreaks. While many of the vulnerabilities associated with natural disasters and pandemics overlap, some factors may have different impacts on communities facing a natural disaster or a pandemic.
    • Much of the recent research on the relationship between SVI and Covid should be read with the understanding that the Covid data was from early in the pandemic. 11–13
Data Source for SVI
Centers for Disease Control 5

Years of Potential Life Lost (YPLL)

Years of Potential Life Lost measures the rate of premature deaths by region. YPLL is calculated as the sum of the estimated number of years that individuals would have lived if they had not died before the age of 75 per 100,000 people.

Using YPLL to allocate CHWs would send the most resources to counties where a large proportion of the population dies before the age of 75.


Strength of YPLL Data as an Indicator of Vulnerability

  • Data captures and compares health trends at the county level.


Limitations of YPLL Data as an Indicator of Vulnerability

  • Data is lagged. YPLL is calculated using the CDC’s National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) mortality data for 2016–2018, and county rates may have changed since then.
  • YPLL speaks to preexisting health disparities in counties but does not reflect elderly populations at a high risk for COVID-19-related hospitalization and mortality. Current data supports a strong association between age and the risk of COVID-19-related hospitalization and mortality.14


Data Sources for YPLL

YPLL rankings for the United States (including Washington, DC) were provided by the County Health Rankings YPLL data for 2016–2018. (15, 7) YPLL for Puerto Rico municipios was calculated using Puerto Rico mortality records for 2015–2016 16 in conjunction with the US Census population estimates. 17.

Medicaid Enrollment

Medicaid is a means-tested health insurance program for low-income children, pregnant women, adults, seniors, and people with disabilities. Medicaid is jointly funded by federal and state governments and managed by states within federal standards and a wide range of state options.

Using Medicaid enrollment to allocate CHWs would send the most resources to counties that had the greatest share of Medicaid enrollees as of the 2018 ACS 5-year estimates.


Strengths of Medicaid Enrollment Data as an Indicator of Vulnerability

  • Data measures health-care needs of vulnerable populations.
  • Data is recent Medicaid data at the state level, which is reported monthly, with a three-month lag.
  • Medicaid may likely be used to pay for CHWs.
  • Much of the research literature on the efficacy of CHWs in the United States was done with Medicaid populations.

  • Limitations of Medicaid Enrollment Data as an Indicator of Vulnerability

    • County-level Medicaid enrollment is estimated. Recent state-level data is allocated to counties based on the US Census Bureau’s 5-year estimates from the 2014–2018 ACS.
    • States are not comparable. Medicaid eligibility differs by state.


    Data Source for Medicaid Enrollment

    State-level Medicaid enrollees: Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services6 County-level Medicaid enrollee estimates: US Census Bureau’s 2014–2018 ACS 5-year estimates 18

    Unemployment

    The US Bureau of Labor Statistics releases monthly estimates of the number of people in the civilian labor force who are without jobs.8

    Using unemployment figures to allocate CHWs would send the most resources to counties that have the greatest share of each state’s total unemployed residents.

    Strength of Unemployment Data as an Indicator of Vulnerability

    • • Data is recent. Unemployment data at the county level is released every month, with a one-month lag.


    Limitations of Unemployment Data as an Indicator of Vulnerability

    • Unemployment figures available at the county level do not include (a) individuals who are unemployed and have not looked for work in the past month and (b) the underemployed.


    Data Source for Unemployment Rate

    US Bureau of Labor Statistics—Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS)19

    COVID-19 Cases and COVID-19 Cases per 100,000 Residents

    The number of COVID-19 cases is an absolute metric of the total number of COVID-19 cases in a county over the last 14 days. COVID-19 cases per 100,000 is a relative metric calculated by dividing the number of COVID-19 cases by the estimated county population and multiplying by 100,000. Cases include both confirmed cases, based on viral testing, and probable cases, based on specific criteria for symptoms and epidemiological exposure.20

    Using COVID-19 cases in the past 14 days to allocate CHWs would target resources to counties that have the largest overall epidemic within the state. Using COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents would send resources to counties where the epidemic is largest in proportion to the population size compared with the state overall.


    Strengths of COVID-19 Cases as a Measure of Vulnerability

    • Both measurements of COVID-19 are the best available metrics of absolute and relative COVID-19 incidence.
    • The number of COVID-19 cases, as an absolute metric, measures the total disease incidence regardless of population size and therefore gives an estimate of total health-care demand.
    • COVID-19 cases per 100,000, as a relative metric, takes into account different population sizes and allows comparisons of disease incidence by county.


    Limitations of COVID-19 Cases as a Measure of Vulnerability

    • Both measurements of COVID-19 are based on testing data and therefore underestimate the total number of persons with the disease due to a combination of low testing rates in general and asymptomatic patients.
    • The number of COVID-19 cases, as an absolute metric, does not take into account background populations and therefore allocates resources to more populous areas.
    • COVID-19 cases per 100,000, as a relative metric, will shift resources proportionally and does not take into account any marginal benefits of treating infectious disease populations by their absolute size.


    Data Sources for COVID-19 Cases and COVID-19 Cases per 100,000

    COVID-19 case data: New York Times Coronavirus (COVID-19) Data in the United States9
    County population data: US Census Bureau’s 2014–2018 ACS 5-year estimates18

    COVID-19 Deaths per 100,000 Residents

    What Are COVID-19 Deaths per 100,000 Residents?

    The number of COVID-19 deaths per capita is the total number of deaths per county population where COVID-19 is listed on the death certificate as either the cause of death or a significant contributing condition to death. Similar to COVID-19 cases, COVID-19 deaths include both confirmed deaths, based on viral testing, and probable deaths, based on specific criteria for symptoms and epidemiological exposure.20

    Using cumulative COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 residents to allocate CHWs would send resources to counties that have seen the highest rate of death compared to each state overall.

    Strength of COVID-19 Deaths as a Measure of Vulnerability

    • COVID-19 death data provides information on which communities have been impacted by COVID-19.


    Limitations of COVID-19 Deaths as a Measure of Vulnerability

    • Mortality rates can be driven by numerous factors, including the number of cases, underlying conditions, age of population, and access to care.
    • Mortality rates speak to the horrible loss of life from the virus; however, they do not capture any of the ongoing long-term health effects associated with COVID-19 that contribute to community vulnerability.


    Data Sources for COVID-19 Deaths per 100,000 Residents

    COVID-19 death data: New York Times Coronavirus (COVID-19) Data in the United States9
    County population data: US Census Bureau’s 2014–2018 ACS 5-year estimates18

    Citing This Project
    If drawing from or reproducing this work, please cite the project as: Columbia Center for Spatial Research and Yale Global Health Partnership. 2020. Mapping the New Politics of Care. newpoliticsofcare.net

    References
    1. Oppel, Richard A., Jr., Robert Gebeloff, K. K. Rebecca Lai, Will Wright, and Mitch Smith. 2020. “The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus.” New York Times, July 5, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-americans-cdc-data.html.
    2. Gonsalves, Gregg, and Amy Kapczynski. 2020. “The New Politics of Care.” Boston Review, April 26, 2020. http://bostonreview.net/politics/gregg-gonsalves-amy-kapczynski-new-politics-care.
    3. Sagynbekov, Ken, and Marlon Graf. 2017. “Are Community Health Workers Saving Lives?” Milken Institute. https://milkeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/reports-pdf/100617-Community-Health-Workers.pdf.
    4. Kangovi, Shreya, Nandita Mitra, David Grande, Judith A. Long, and David A. Asch. 2020. “Evidence-Based Community Health Worker Program Addresses Unmet Social Needs and Generates Positive Return on Investment: A Return on Investment Analysis of a Randomized Controlled Trial of a Standardized Community Health Worker Program That Addresses Unmet Social Needs for Disadvantaged Individuals.” Health Affairs 39 (2): 207–213. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00981.
    5. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2020. “CDC Social Vulnerability Index (SVI),” September 4, 2020. https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/placeandhealth/svi/index.html.
    6. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2020. “State Medicaid and CHIP Applications, Eligibility Determinations, and Enrollment Data, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.” https://data.medicaid.gov/Enrollment/State-Medicaid-and-CHIP-Applications-Eligibility-D/n5ce-jxme.
    7. University of Wisconsin Population Health Institute and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. 2020. “2020 County Health Rankings National Data.” https://www.countyhealthrankings.org/explore-health-rankings/rankings-data-documentation.
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    10. Goldstein, Amy. 2020. “Medicaid Rolls Swell amid the Pandemic’s Historic Job Losses, Straining State Budgets.” Washington Post, September 14, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/covid-medicaid-enrollment-increases/2020/09/14/84b6249a-e6f1-11ea-97e0-94d2e46e759b_story.html.
    11. Karaye, Ibraheem M., and Jennifer A. Horney. 2020. “The Impact of Social Vulnerability on COVID-19 in the U.S.: An Analysis of Spatially Varying Relationships.” American Journal of Preventive Medicine 59 (3): 317–325. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2020.06.006.
    12. Nayak, Aditi, Shabatun J. Islam, Anurag Mehta, Yi-An Ko, Shivani A. Patel, Abhinav Goyal, Samaah Sullivan, Tene T. Lewis, Viola Vaccarino, Alanna A. Morris, and Arshed A. Quyyumi. 2020. “Impact of Social Vulnerability on COVID-19 Incidence and Outcomes in the United States.” MedRxiv, 2020.04.10.20060962. https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.04.10.20060962.
    13. Amram, Ofer, Solmaz Amiri, Robert B. Lutz, Bhardwaj Rajan, and Pablo Monsivais. 2020. “Development of a Vulnerability Index for Diagnosis with the Novel Coronavirus, COVID-19, in Washington State, USA.” Health & Place 64, 102377–102377. PMC. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2020.102377.
    14. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2020. “COVID-19 Hospitalization and Death by Age.” February 11, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/COVID-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-by-age.html.
    15. Remington, Patrick L., Bridget B. Catlin, and Keith P. Gennuso. 2015. “The County Health Rankings: Rationale and Methods.” Population Health Metrics 13 (1): 11. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12963-015-0044-2.
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